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TELLURIDE'S TALE OF EMINENT DOMAIN, HOME RULE,
AND RETROACTiVITY
RICHARD B. COLLINS t

Telluride is an upscale ski town located at the closed end of a box
canyon in southwestern Colorado. In 2000, the town began to set aside
twenty percent of annual revenue in a fund to acquire private land between the town boundary and the canyon's mouth, the area known as the
Valley Floor.' The landowner was determined to develop the property
commercially; town residents were equally determined to acquire it for
parks, recreation, and open space. The principal landowner was the San
Miguel Valley Corporation.2 Its main owner is billionaire Neal Blue,
CEO of General Atomics Corporation of San Diego, a major defense
contractor. 3 Blue is a Denver native whose parents were successful investors and financiers. His mother, a state treasurer and University of
Colorado Regent, is honored in a stained glass window in the State Capitol.4 Neal Blue bought the Valley Floor in 1983 for a reported six to
seven million dollars.5 General Atomics is best known as maker of the
Predator drone aircraft.6 A Fortune magazine article about Blue said that
style in business gave him the personal nickname
his take-no-prisoners
7
of "The Predator.",
In 2002, town voters by popular initiative adopted Ordinance No.
1174 to condemn 572 acres of the Valley Floor next to the town owned
by San Miguel Valley Corporation.8 A Notice of Intent to Acquire was
t Professor, University of Colorado. Thanks to faculty colleagues who made useful suggestions at a faculty workshop on a draft of this paper. Ben Schler and Brad Watts, both University of
Colorado class of 2010, provided valuable research assistance.
1. Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp., 185 P.3d 161, 164 (Colo. 2008).
2. Bruce V. Bigelow, A Rockies Saga, SAN DIEGO UNION TRiB., Mar. 25, 2007, at Fl, available at http://www.signonsandiego.comluniontrib/20070325/news-tz Ib25bigelow.html.
See id.
3.
4. See Matt Potter, General Atomics: Color it Blue, SAN DIEGO WKLY. READER, July 12,
2001, available at http://www.sandiegoreader.com/news/2001/jul1Y2/general-aton-ics-color-it-blue;
Colo. State Archives, Colorado State Capitol Virtual Tour, http://www.colorado.gov/dpa/doit/ archives /cap/blue.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2009).
5.
See Bigelow, supranote 2, at Fl.
6. See Potter, supranote 4.
See Barney Gimbel, The Predator, FORTuNE, Nov. 10, 2008, at 122, available at
7.
http://money.cnn.com/2008/10/28/magazines/fortune/predator--gimbel.fortune/index.htm.
8.
See Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp., 185 P.3d 161, 164 (Colo. 2008). The
parcel taken was reported to be "almost two-thirds" of Blue's holdings in the valley. Bruce V.
Bigelow, Setback for S.D. Industrialist,SAN DIEGO UNION TRW., May 10, 2007, at CI, availableat
http:lwww.signonsandiego.comluniontrib/200705 10/news_lblOblue.html. The trial record showed
that the corporation retained 233 acres and related water rights. See Appellee's Answer Brief at 3
n.2, Telluride, 185 P.3d 161 (No. 07SA101), 2007 WL 4312700; see also Telluride Town Council
Res. No. 1, ex.a (2006) (onfile with author)(describing the larger holding involved in the proposed
settlement of the dispute).
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served on the landowner the following July, followed by on offer to purchase that the landowner rejected. The town filed its condemnation action on March 26, 2004. 9 Shortly before that, the landowner procured an
amendment to a pending bill in the legislature on regulating eminent
domain in urban renewal.10 The amendment became law the following
June. It forbids extraterritorial eminent domain by Colorado municipalities for purposes of parks, recreation, and open space." This provision
was expressly retroactive to January 1 of that year and was popularly
called the Telluride Amendment. 12 The landowner moved to dismiss the
condemnation action based on the statute, but the district court held the
statute invalid under the Colorado Home Rule Amendment and denied
the motion. 13 As discussed below, this ruling was reasonably faithful to
Colorado precedents.
The district court ordered mediation, and negotiations were held for
over a year under guidance of a retired judge.' 4 In December 2005, town
officials reached a tentative compromise with the landowner, which
would have provided for annexation of all of respondent's Valley Floor
land, allowed development of about nine percent of it, and preserved the
rest.1 5 But the condemnation ordinance had been adopted by popular
vote, so the proposed compromise had to go6 back to the voters. After a
vigorous public debate, they turned it down.'
I. VENUE AND JURORS FOR EMINENT DOMAIN TRIALS

The next phase of the eminent domain action was valuation. The
landowner demanded a jury, all members of which by Colorado statute

Appellants' Opening Brief at 2, Telluride, 185 P.3d 161 (No. 07SA101), 2007 WL
9.
2813743.
10. See COLO. H. JOURNAL, Feb. 25, 2004, 649-53 (describing the proposed amendment).
11.
H.B. 04-1203, 64th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. sec. 6, 2004 Colo. Sess. Laws 1747,
(codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-101(4) (West 2009)). The statute provides
that land cannot be condemned for these purposes without the landowner's consent, which is another
way to say that it is forbidden.
12.
See Pat Healy, In VF Appeal, These Are the Deciders, TELLURIDE DAILY PLANET, Aug.
15, 2007, available at http://www.telluridegateway.com/articles/2007/08/16/news/newsOl.txt.
13.
See Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 9, at 2-4. The Home Rule Amendment appears
in article XX of the Colorado Constitution. The landowner's motion in the alternative asked for a
change of venue for the valuation trial. The court denied this motion but later granted a second
request. See Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp., No. 04CV22, at 2-3 (San Miguel Dist.
Ct. Nov. 2, 2006) (memorandum opinion and order granting respondent's renewed motion to change
venue).
14.
See Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp., No. 04CV22, at 2-3 (San Miguel Dist.
Ct. Nov. 2, 2006) (memorandum opinion and order granting respondents' renewed motion to change
venue); Respondents' Renewed Motion to Change Venue at 2, Town of Telluride v. San Miguel
Valley Corp., No. 04CV22 (San Miguel Dist. CL Mar. 14, 2006). Authority to order mediation is
conferred by COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-311 (West 2009).
15.
See Telluride Town Council Res. No. 1, ex. a (2006) (on file with author); see also Telluride Town Council Res. No. 2, ex. a(2006) (on file with author).
16.
See Appellants' Opening Brief at 8 n.3, Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp.,
185 P.3d 161 (Colo. 2008) (No. 07SA101), 2007 WL 2813743.
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had to be freeholders. 17 It also filed a renewed motion for change of venue.1 8 This could have raised a constitutional issue. The statute guaranteeing landowners a jury of freeholders also requires that they be residents of the county where the petition is filed, which usually must be
where the land is located, and the town argued that the statute precluded
changing venue. 19 The landowner claimed that the vote against the compromise, although confined to the town, showed that it could not get a
fair jury in San Miguel County.20 It argued that obeying the statute
would therefore be unconstitutional as applied, and it invoked the general
Colorado court rule governing changes of venue in civil cases, which
allows changes for jury bias.2'
The district court agreed with the landowner on the fair trial claim
and granted its motion, but not on constitutional grounds. Instead, the
court invoked a 1925 decision not cited by the parties. Denver had filed
an action to condemn land in Jefferson County to use for a park based on
a statute that required the eminent domain petition to be filed in Denver. 22 The Colorado Supreme Court ordered venue moved to Jefferson
County based on the general venue statue then in force, noting that the
COLO.REv. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-106 (West 2009) (requiring at least six freeholders); see
17.
also COLO. CONST. art. 1I,§ 15 (requiring valuation in eminent domain by a commission of three
freeholders or by a jury). Five other states provide for valuation by commissions of three (in some
cases three or more) freeholders, two by constitution, three by statute. MO. CONST. art. I, § 26;
OKLA. CONST. art. IL § 24; MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 213.3 (West 2009); NEB.REV. STAT. ANN. §
76-706 (LexisNexis 2009); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 21.014 (Vernon 2007). Only one other stateWest Virginia-limits eminent domain juries to landowners. W. VA. CONST. art. 1I, § 9. Umiting
voting and jury service to landowners (and to men) was once common everywhere, but politics
gradually broadened juror qualifications. See Douglas G. Smith, The Historicaland Constitutional
Contexts of Jury Reform, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 377, 432-34, (1996). More recently, Supreme Court
constitutional decisions eliminated most other laws restricting voting and jury service to property
owners. See id. at 462-69. The eminent domain rules appear to be the only remaining instance of
blue-ribbon juries. It is conceivable that the Constitution forbids limiting eminent domain juries to
freeholders. Cf Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95, 106-09 (1989) (invalidating restriction of state board
to freeholders). However, challenges to the practice are unlikely for political reasons.
18.
Respondents' Renewed Motion to Change Venue at 1, Town of Telluride v. San Miguel
Valley Corp., No. 04CV22 (San Miguel Dist. Ct. Mar. 14,2006).
COLO.REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-106 (West 2009) (requiring "a jury of freeholders residing
19.
in the county in which the petition is filed"). The basic provision for a taking requires the condemnor to file in the county in which the property or part if it is located. Id. § 38-1-102.
20. Respondents' Renewed Motion to Change Venue at 2, Town of Telluride v. San Miguel
Valley Corp., No. 04CV22 (San Miguel Dist. Ct. Mar. 14,2006).
21.
COLO.R. Civ. P. 98(g).
22. People ex rel. Bear Creek Dev. Corp. v. Dist. Court, 242 P. 997, 997-98 (Colo. 1925); see
Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp., No. 04CV22, at 9-10 (San Miguel Dist. Ct. Nov. 2,
2006) (memorandum opinion and order granting respondents' renewed motion to change venue).
The statute Denver relied on in Bear Creek Dev. Corp. for power to condemn was the Act of June 3,
1911, ch. 129, 1911 Colo. Sess. Laws 373-82. The Act gave cities explicit extraterritorial power to
condemn for "boulevard, parkway, or park purposes." Id at 377, § 10 (codified as amended at
COLO.REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-110 (West 2009)). The section was amended in 1983 to limit extraterritorial power to land within five miles of city boundaries subject to stated exceptions, one of
which is condemnation with county consent. In 1959, § 1 of the 1911 statute was amended to state
that extraterritorial eminent domain is forbidden unless "specifically authorized by law." Act of
May 18, 1959, ch. 118, 1959 Colo. Sess. Laws 423 (1959) (codified as amended at COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 38-6-101 (West 2009)).
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eminent domain statute relied on by Denver did not forbid changing venue. 23 The statute requiring that jurors reside in the county in which the
petition is filed was then in force, though not mentioned in the court's
opinion. 24 The general venue statute of 1925 is the direct ancestor of
today's Colorado court rule governing civil case venue; 25 hence the 1925
decision, by implication, supported the Telluride court's decision that the
court rule on venue prevailed over the eminent domain jury statute. Decisions to change venue are often made only after jury selection fails to
seat a suitably unbiased jury, but the district judge in Telluride declined
to make the attempt.2 6
Whether there is a constitutional right to change venue in an eminent domain action based on potential jury bias was thus avoided. It
would be an interesting question. Criminal defendants often seek
changes of venue for potential jury bias, and volumes of reported appellate decisions and academic commentaries parse the issue. 27 By contrast,
2
reported cases on requests to move civil cases for jury bias are rare. 8
When the issue arises, courts usually apply the same kind of reasoning as
in criminal cases. However, constitutional rights to juries in criminal
prosecutions are separate from those for civil actions and more strictly
applied. The Sixth Amendment jury right of criminal defendants is fully
applicable against the states, while the Seventh Amendment right to a
civil jury is not.29 Thus civil jury rights depend on state law. Lacking
much in the way of jury trial precedents to rely on, the Telluride landowner argued that the federal and state constitutional right to just compensation for takings requires the right to be heard by an impartial jury.3°
There is no direct federal support for this claim. The landowner cited
several decisions from other states, but all were based on statutes or court
rules rather than constitutional grounds.

23.
Bear Creek Dev. Corp., 242 P. at 998.
24.
See COMP. LAW. CoLO. § 6317 (1921) (current version at CoLO. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 381-106 (West 2009)).
25.
See Cow. R. Civ. P. 98(g), in COLO. STAT. ANN. vol. 1 (1935 & Supp. 1941). The 1925
Bear Creek Dev. Corp. decision is the only reported case in which a Colorado appellate court ordered a change of venue in a civil case.
26.
See Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp., No. 04CV22, at 3-9 (San Miguel Dist.
Ct. Nov. 2, 2006) (memorandum opinion and order granting respondents' renewed motion to change
venue).
27.
See, e.g., Laurie L. Levenson, Change of Venue and the Role of the CriminalJury, 66 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1533, 1535 (1993).
28.
For example, among hundreds of annotations to the federal civil venue statute in 28
U.S.C.A. § 1404 (West 2009), none reported granting a change of venue for jury bias. Colorado has
only the 1925 decision relied on by the Telluride district court. See supra note 22, 25. The landowner in Telluride cited Colorado Fuel & Iron Co. v. FourMile Railway Co., 66 P. 902 (Colo.
1901), where a change of venue was unsuccessfully sought based on alleged bias of the judge.
29.
WILLAM COHEN, JONATHAN D. VARAT & VIKRAM AMAR, CONsTIUTIoNAL LAW 51112 (12th ed. 2005).

30. See Respondents' Renewed Motion to Change Venue at 24, Town of Telluride v. San
Miguel Valley Corp., No. 04CV22 (San Miguel Dist. Ct. Mar. 14,2006).
31.
See id. at 25.
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Unlike most states, the Colorado Constitution has no general guarantee of a civil jury.32 There is a specific guarantee for eminent domain
actions, which provides for valuation by three commissioners who must
be freeholders or by a jury, although it does not require that jurors be
freeholders or residents of the local county. 33 As noted above, the statute
does require that jurors be both freeholders and residents. Therefore, the
landowner in Telluride wanted a ruling that the statute's requirement that
jurors be residents was inapplicable or unconstitutional as applied but
fully severable from the requirement that they be freeholders. The
court's ruling granted exactly that but without analyzing these points.
The district court moved the valuation trial to neighboring Delta
County, a more favorable venue for the landowner as the ensuing verdict
reflected. 34 The town's last offer before the jury's verdict was $26 million; the landowner claimed a value of almost $51 million. The jury's
verdict was for $50 million.35 After the verdict, the town had three
months to raise the extra funds.36 Many thought this would end the
town's quest for the Valley Floor, but Telluride is home or second home
to many wealthy (and celebrated) citizens, including Tom Cruise, Christie Brinkley, Daryl Hannah, and Oprah Winfrey.3 7 The town not only
raised the money, it did so eleven days early.38 Furthermore, because
Colorado requires a condemning town to reimburse attorneys fees when

32.
2004).
33.

Garhart ex rel. Tinsman v. Columbia/HealthONE, L.L.C., 95 P.3d 571, 580-81 (Colo.
COLO. CONST. art. 11, § 15.

34.
Delta County is in the same judicial district as San Miguel County, and the district judge
who heard the Telluride case normally sits there, so it was a natural choice for him. See Seventh
Judicial District, http://www.7thjudicialdistrictco.org/index.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2009). However, Delta is considered one of Colorado's most politically conservative counties, much more so
than San Miguel. For example, 2009 voter registrations for the two counties included 9,397 Republicans and 4,513 Democrats in Delta County, compared to 1,108 Republicans and 2,719 Democrats
in San Miguel County. See COLO. SEC'Y OF STATE, TOTAL REGISTERED VOTERS BY PARTY
AFFILIATION AND STATUS (2009), http://www.elections.colorado.gov/WWW/default/2009%20Voter

%20Registration%20Numbers/January/by-party.pdf. On the relevance of party affiliation to eminent domain, see infra text accompanying notes 168-70.
35. Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp., 185 P.3d 161, 164 (Colo. 2008); cf City
of Black Hawk v. Ficke, No. 06CA1302, 2008 WL 732043, at *1 (Colo. App. Mar. 20, 2008) ("Following a valuation trial, the jury detennined that $637,500 was just compensation for the taking,
which was over six times higher than the City appraiser's opinion of value, and $100,000 more than
the valuation opinion of respondents' appraiser."). The city abandoned the condemnation, and the
court upheld the abandonment but awarded respondents their attorneys' fees. Id.
36. The jury's verdict was entered on February 20, 2007. This was followed by a hearing on
the amount of time the town had for raising the funds to satisfy the verdict because there was no
explicit Colorado rule setting a deadline. The landowner argued for 44 days, until April 5. The
town argued for no deadline or in the alternative for 90 days, until May 21. The district court
adopted the May 21 deadline.
37.
Wikipedia, Telluride, Colorado, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Telluride,_Colorado (last
visited April 17, 2009) (listing notable residents).
38. See Bigelow, supranote 2, at Fl.
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an eminent domain verdict is 130% or more of the town's last39 offer, Telluride had to pay almost $2.8 million more for fees and costs.
The eminent domain action at last had a final judgment that could
be appealed, and the landowner did so, seeking to enforce the 2004 Telluride Amendment. The town did not challenge the venue decision.
Under Colorado law, a trial court judgment holding a state statute to be
unconstitutional is reviewed directly by the Colorado Supreme Court.n°
In June 2008, that court affirmed the judgment, holding the statute to be
an unconstitutional interference with Telluride's home rule powers. 41
The validity of the statute depended entirely on the Home Rule Amendment because the town declined to argue that the statute was invalid as
applied retroactively to the condemnation action. 42 However, both questions are interesting issues of state constitutional law.
II. TELLURIDE'S HOME RULE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN

Constitutional home rule began in Colorado with adoption of the
1902 amendment to the Colorado Constitution that made Denver a consolidated city and county, gave it home rule powers, and offered like
powers to other municipalities.43 The original amendment included the
power at issue in the Telluride case. It provides that a home rule city or
town "shall have the power, within or without its territorial limits, to
construct, condemn and purchase ... water works, light plants, power
plants, transportation systems, heating plants, and any other public utilities or works or ways local in use and extent ...for public use by right
of eminent domain .... 4" Of course, to take advantage of this provision, a municipal charter 45must claim the power, but Telluride's charter,
adopted in 1978, does so.
A. The Precedent
The landowner's counsel built their legal strategy around avoidance
of the Colorado Supreme Court's 1978 decision in City of Thornton v.
Farmers Reservoir and Irrigation Co.46 In 1973, Thornton filed an ac39.
Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp., 197 P.3d 261, 262 (Colo. App. 2008)
(applying COLO.REV. STAT. § 38-1-122(1.5) (2007)). The statute applies only if the award is at
least $10,000. COLO.REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-122(1.5) (West 2009). After unsuccessful appeal of
denial of its motion to dismiss, the landowner sought attorneys fees for that proceeding as well, but
the court denied the claim. Telluride, 197 P.3d at 262.
40. The Colorado Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction is provided in the Colorado Constitution. COLO.CONST. art. VL § 2(1). When a district or county court has declared a state law to be
unconstitutional, intermediate jurisdiction of the Colorado Court of Appeals is barred. COLO.REV.
STAT. ANN. §13-4-102(1)(b) (West 2009).
41.
Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp., 185 P.3d 161, 163 (Colo. 2008).
42.
Cf infra Part m.
43.
COLO.CONST. art. XX.

44.

id. art. XX, §1.

45.
HOME RULE CHARTER OF THE TOWN OF TELLURIDE art. XIV, § 14.1 (1978), available at
http:lwww.telluride-co.gov/docs00_charter-final-telluride-s-lrevclc.pdf.
46.
575 P.2d 382 (Colo. 1978).
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tion to condemn a large part of the water rights owned by the company.
The rights in question were sited in a lake outside the city, so the condemnation was extraterritorial. The action was filed based on existing
statutes that allowed Thornton to decide on necessity for the taking and
provided for valuation to be done in the same manner as in most other
eminent domain actions.47 Nineteen months later the legislature passed a
new statute that would have made Thornton's acquisition much more
difficult. It applied only to condemnation of water rights and required
convening a special commission to determine whether condemnation was
necessary and if so to determine just compensation. s The statute also
limited condemnation to water needed within a horizon of fifteen years.4 9
Defendants moved to dismiss based on Thornton's failure to comply with
the new statute, and the district court granted the motion.50
The supreme court reversed. Oddly, its opinion never discussed
whether the new statute was intended to apply retroactively to Thornton's pending case. The terms of the statute, unlike those of the Telluride Amendment, were not expressly retroactive, and the usual rule presumes a new statute to be prospective in operation. 51 It is likely that the
statute would never have been applied to a completed condemnation action, but Thornton's was in mid-stream.
Instead, the court held the statute's two main features-commitment
of decision to a special commission and limiting future needs to a fifteenyear period-to be unconstitutional as applied to Thornton based on the
Home Rule Amendment. The court concluded:
By the adoption of Article XX [Section 1], ... the people of Colorado intended to, and in effect did, delegate to home rule municipalities full power to exercise the right of eminent domain in the effectuation of any lawful, public and municipal purpose, including particularly the acquisition of water rights.

...We fully recognize that, generally, the legislative powers of a
home rule municipality are superior with respect to local and municipal matters; and that, in cases of conflict between a statute and the
ordinance of a home rule city relating to a matter of statewide concern, the statute must govern. Here, however, there is involved a
specific constitutional power granted to home rule municipalities
and, even though the matter may be of statewide concern, the Gener-

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 386.
See id. at 386 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-6-201 to -216 (1973 & Supp. 1976)).
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-202(2) (West 2009); Thornton, 575 P.2d at 390.
Thornton, 575 P.2d at 386.
See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
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al Assembly has no power to enact any law 52
that denies a right specifically granted by the Colorado Constitution.
The court's opinion appeared to recognize that Thornton was subject to other state statutes governing eminent domain, but none of these
would have placed the condemnation in jeopardy, and Thornton did not
oppose them.5 3 However, application of these statutes created doubt
about the scope of the decision. A 1989 decision clarified the issue to
some extent, holding that a state statute known as the Land Use Act
"gives Grand County and Eagle County the power to regulate, but not to
prohibit, Denver's operation of extraterritorial waterworks projects."'
B. How to Deal with It?
The Thornton decision was a major obstacle for the landowner in
Telluride. The case upheld extraterritorial eminent domain in apparent
conflict with a governing state statute, the very power claimed by Telluride. The usual options were to distinguish the case or to ask the court to
overrule or limit it. If the decision were to be distinguished, how should
it be done? The landowner's counsel based its case mostly on distinguishing different objects of extraterritorial condemnation, between
Thornton's water rights and Telluride's proposed parks, open space, and
recreational uses. The core basis for this claim was the text of article
XX, section 1, which explicitly gives eminent domain power for a list of
public utilities purposes or other "works or ways local in use and extent. '55 The Thornton opinion held that water rights came within the
specific power to condemn for "water works. 56 Telluride's condemnation was unrelated to any of the specific subjects in section 1.
The landowner's plea to read article XX strictly was supported by
the argument that eminent domain power is distinctive and disfavored, so
it should be implied to have a more restricted scope than others. This
claim had force in the abstract, as the Colorado Supreme Court has often
said that legislative grants of the power must be clearly expressed or necessarily impliedY. The difficulty was that the court's prior decisions had
52.
Thronton, 575 P.2d at 389 (citations omitted).
53.
See id at 386.
54.
City & County of Denver v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 782 P.2d 753, 762 (Colo. 1989); see
also Land Use Act, COLO.REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-65.1-101 to -502 (West 2009).
55.

COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 1.

56.
Thornton, 575 P.2d at 535-36; see also Toll v. City & County of Denver, 340 P.2d 862,
865 (Colo. 1959) (sustaining extraterritorial eminent domain to take flowage easements and channel
improvement rights based on the "water works" power in the Colorado Constitution); Town of
Glendale v. City & County of Denver, 322 P.2d 1053, 1056-57 (Colo. 1958) (same issue for sewer
right of way).
57.
See, e.g., Dep't of Transp. v. Stapleton, 97 P.3d 938, 941-42 (Colo. 2004). Several early
decisions applied this rule to invalidate attempts at extraterritorial eminent domain by statutory
municipalities.

See, e.g., Mack v. Town of Craig, 191 P. 101, 101 (Colo. 1920) (sewage outlet);

Healy v. City of Delta., 147 P. 662, 662 (Colo. 1915) (sewage outlet); Warner v. Town of Gunnison,
31 P. 238, 239 (Colo. App. 1892) (right-of-way for water supply ditch). In reaction to Mack and
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found article XX, section 1 explicit enough to sustain other unenumerated powers of eminent domain. 8 Thus, there was no reasonable basis
to distinguish parks, recreation, and open space. Another way to articulate the issue is to ask at what level the requirement for explicit legislative action applies. The Colorado court rulings that interpreted article
XX broadly had the effect of locating the requirement for an explicit
legislative act within home rule municipalities unless the state legislature
has power to override them.
1. The Claim That Municipal Eminent Domain Power is Limited to
Utilities Purposes
The landowner first argued that article XX, section 1 restricts municipal powers of eminent domain to the itemized list and analogous public utilities uses and does not extend to parks, recreation, and open
space. 59 This claim faced difficulties. The constitutional text bundles all
active powers of a municipality with eminent domain powers. To restrict
a town to the specified powers even within its borders would limit home
rule to far fewer powers than Denver had exercised before 1902 as a statutory city. For this reason, the Colorado Supreme Court's first opinion
on the subject rejected a claim that Denver could not build a municipal
auditorium. The court stated:
[W]e do not agree... that the stinted grant of power contained in
section 1 and other parts of the article is the only power possessed by
Denver. It seems very clear that the statement contained in the first
section was not intended to be an enumeration of powers conferred,
but simply the expression of a few of the more prominent powers
which municipal corporations are frequently granted. The purpose of
the twentieth article was to grant home rule to Denver and the other
municipalities of the state, and it was intended to enlarge the powers
beyond those usually granted by the legislature .... 60
Six years later, the court applied similar reasoning to sustain Denver's
power to condemn land for parks.6'
Notwithstanding these decisions in Denver's favor, in other early
cases the Colorado Supreme Court interpreted home rule powers narrowly. 62 In reaction, voters used the new power of initiative in 1912 to replace 1902's article XX, section 6 with a broader text that grants home
Healy, the legislature passed a statute to authorize extraterritorial eminent domain for specified
utilities purposes. 1921 Colo. Sess. Laws 773 (codified at CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-122
(West 2009)).
58.
See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
59.
Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp., 185 P.3d 161, 163 (Colo. 2008).
60.
City & County of Denver v. Hallett, 83 P. 1066, 1068 (Colo. 1905).
61.
Londoner v. City & County of Denver, 119 P. 156, 158-59 (Colo. 1911). The condemnations at issue in Londoner were within Denver. Id. at 158.
62.
See DALE A. OEsTERLE & RIcHARD B. CoutNs, THE COLORADO STATE CONSTITUTION
390 (2002).
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rule municipalities all powers set out in the original sections of article
XX, as well as "all other powers necessary, requisite or proper for the
government and administration of its local and municipal matters." This
section was the focus of a 1971 decision in which challengers argued that
Denver lacked urban renewal powers because they were not itemized in
article XX, section 1.63 The court responded: "The enumerated purposes
of § 1 were superseded by the general § 6 standard of 'local and municipal matters.' 64
2. The Claim That Municipalities Have No Extraterritorial Power
to Condemn for Parks and Open Space
The landowner next argued that constitutional power outside municipal boundaries should be restricted to the itemized list and similar utilities purposes, or at least should exclude power to condemn land for parks
and open space. In addressing this claim, the Colorado Supreme Court
stated that extraterritorial condemnation for parks and open space was a
question of first impression that depended on whether this was "a lawful,
65
public, local, and municipal purpose within the scope of article XX.
This claim again conflicted with the constitutional text that equates
internal with external powers and eminent domain with all other powers.
The landowner answered this point by invoking a clause in article XX,
section 6, added in 1912, which differentiates between internal and external powers:
Such charter and the ordinances made pursuant thereto in such matters shall supersede within the territorial limits and other jurisdiction
66
of said city or town any law of the state in conflict therewith.
This provision is relevant to validity of the 2004 Telluride Amendment, as discussed below. As a basis to claim that Telluride lacked external power of eminent domain in the absence of a conflicting state statute, it was weak. By its terms, the provision takes in the "other jurisdiction" of the municipality. 67 On parks in particular, section 6 grants explicit power over park districts "in such cities or towns or within the jurisdiction thereof., 68 And the part of section 6 quoted above made it
clear that the section was intended to add to, not subtract from, the home
rule powers granted in 1902. The supreme court made these points in
rejecting the claim.69

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Karsh v. City & County of Denver, 490 P.2d 936, 937 (Colo. 1971).
Id. at 939.
Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp., 185 P.3d 161, 167 (Colo. 2008).
COLO.CONST. art. XX, § 6.
Id.
Id.
Telluride, 185 P.3d at 166.
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The court went on to sustain the power, based again on the 1905
Hallett decision quoted above. 70 That decision interpreted section 1 to
confer all powers that the legislature could have delegated to municipalities. The Hallett court cited several statutes that had delegated extraterritorial powers of eminent domain for various
purposes, including parks
71
and open space, to municipal governments.
Both of the landowner's claims based on pre-2004 law had been rejected in at least two previous decisions of the supreme court that sustained extraterritorial condemnations for purposes not enumerated in
article, XX section 1.72 Moreover, there was a long-established legislative practice of granting eminent domain powers to private companies for
many purposes73 and of granting extraterritorial powers to statutory municipalities; 74 thus, municipal boundaries had not previously been an
important criterion. In rejecting a 1926 attack on a statutory city's extraterritorial condemnation, the supreme court minimized the point by stating: "The condemnation statutes do not limit the rights of the city to take
property only within its municipal borders. 7 5
Both of these claims faced yet another obstacle that was argued to
the court but not mentioned in its opinion. The Colorado Constitution
was amended in 1998 to create the City and County of Broomfield.76
The amendment includes an updated version of the list of powers, including the eminent domain power, in the original Home Rule Amendment.
The Broomfield provision expressly allows condemnation of land "within and without its territorial limits" to establish "parks, recreation facilities, [and] open space lands. 77 Because the Broomfield amendment was
intended to imitate, not add to, home rule status of other municipalities,
this provision implies the view that these uses were within the general
70.
Id. at 168 (citing City & County of Denver v. Hallett, 83 P. 1066, 1068 (1905)).
71.
Id. It could also have referred to the decision relied on by the district court to order
change of venue, which involved extraterritorial eminent domain for park purposes. See supra note
22 and accompanying text.
72.
City & County of Denver v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 156 P.2d 101, 108-09 (Colo. 1945)
(airport); Fishel v. City & County of Denver, 108 P.2d 236, 242 (Colo. 1940) (military use).
Moreover, the decisions sustaining extraterritorial powers arguably within those enumerated in
article XX, section 1 articulated the power in broad terms. In addition to Thornton, see Toll v. City
& County of Denver, 340 P.2d 862, 865-66 (Colo. 1959) (flowage easements); Town of Glendale v.
City & County of Denver, 322 P.2d 1053, 1056-57 (Colo. 1958) (utilities easement). The Colorado
Court of Appeals made a yet more explicit ruling in Town of Parkerv. Norton, sustaining extraterritorial eminent domain by a home-rule town for a recreational trail. 939 P.2d 535, 536-37 (Colo.
App. 1997), cert. denied, Norton v. Town of Parker, No. 97SC567, 1997 Colo. LEXIS 1112 (Colo.
Dec. 22, 1997).
73.
See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-202(2) (West 2009).
74.
The Telluride court relied on two such statutes. See 185 P.3d at 168 (citing COLO. REV.
STAT. § 31-25-201(1) (2007) (park or recreational purposes, parkways, open space, conservation
easements), § 38-6-110 (2007) (boulevard, parkway, and park purposes)). Both statutes remain on
the books though partially repealed by inconsistency with the Telluride Amendment. See id. §§ 3125-201(1), 38-6-110.
75.
Pub. Serv. Co. v. City of Loveland, 245 P. 493, 499 (Colo. 1926).
76. COLO. CONST. art. XX, §§ 10-13.
77. Id. § 10.
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power of other home rule governments. 78 Of course, the opposite inference is possible, though much less likely.
3. The Claim that the 2004 Telluride Amendment Repealed Extraterritorial Power to Condemn for Parks and Open Space
The landowner's last claim, oddly deferred to the end of its opening
brief, was its strongest: even if extraterritorial eminent domain for parks
and open space had been valid, the 2004 statute took away the power.
The statute, which
"proposed amend" the "court called the landowner's
"
r,,79
ment" for which it had "lobbied the state legislature,
was based on the
same strategy as the arguments discussed above. It preserved extraterritorial eminent domain for the purposes itemized in article XX, section 1
and related public utilities uses and forbade it for all other purposes. For
good measure, it explicitly prohibited the power for parks, open space,
and recreation. It also disallowed use of municipal funds for that purpose by any other entity, an apparent attempt to head off creation of a
special district to achieve Telluride's purpose.
The Telluride Amendment was tacked onto a statute to restrict use
of eminent domain for urban renewal that had been introduced at the
beginning of the legislative session.8 2 This was a year before the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Kelo v. City of New London83 generated a
national reaction against that subject. 84 In Colorado, the urban renewal
change was provoked by a controversial proposal to condemn a lake as a
site for Wal-Mart. 5 Ironically, the Colorado Supreme Court held that
proposed taking to be illegal about the same time as Telluride filed its
eminent domain action.8 6 In any case, the decision against Wal-Mart did
not derail the anti-urban renewal statute.
78.
The 1998 "blue book" informing voters about ballot measures stated nothing relevant to
this question. See LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, COLO. GEN. ASSEMBLY, ANALYSIS OF 1998 BALLOT
PROPOSALS (1998), http://www.state.co.us/gov-dir/leg-dir/lcsstaff/ballot/analy-c.htm. Nor do the
published records of passage of the measure through the legislature. See Colo. Gen. Assembly, 1998
Senate Resolutions and Memorials, http://www.state.co.us/gov dir/leg_dir/house/sres98.htm (last
visited Apr. 17, 2009) (reporting on S. Con. Res. 98-013, 61st Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo.
1998)). Nor do any of the newspaper accounts of the measure. Therefore, the statement in the text
is the author's opinion. Of course, in light of the result in the Telluride case, the powers of other
home-rule municipalities are comparable to those of Broomfield.
79.
Telluride, 185 P.3d at 164.
80.
COLO.REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-101(4)(b) (West 2009).
81.
See id.; see also id. § 38-1-202(1)(f)(Vl) (eminent domain power of park and recreation
districts).
82.
See H.B. 04-1203, 64th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2004) (codified as amended at
COLO.REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-25-105.5, 38-1-101(4) (West 2009)).
83.
545 U.S. 469 (2005).
84.
See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Uphold Taking Propertyfor Development, N.Y. TIMES,
June 24, 2005, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/24/politics/24scotus.html?
emc=etal; Jonathan V. Last, The Kelo Backlash: What the Supreme Court Touched off With Its
Eminent Domain Decision, THE WKLY. STANDARD, Aug. 21, 2006, at 14.
85. See Arvada Urban Renewal Auth. v. Columbine Prof I Plaza Ass'n, 85 P.3d 1066, 106768 (Colo. 2004).
86. Id. at 1073.
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The Telluride Amendment's hasty consideration was illustrated by
the fact that it left unamended a conflicting statute that expressly allowed
municipalities to condemn land within five miles outside their boundaries for park and open space purposes.8 7 It also made no attempt to harmonize its requirements with the state's general Land Use Act, which
had been applied to limit home rule powers. 88 Moreover, the text of the
Telluride Amendment appears to give counties a veto power over agreed
settlements of eminent domain cases where a municipality seeks land for
parks, open space, or recreation outside its boundaries.8 9 If this reading
is correct, it made the landowner's attempted compromise with Telluride
contingent on the consent of San Miguel County. 90
For its claim based on the Telluride Amendment, the landowner
tried to work around the Thornton case in two ways. One was an application of its utilities theory of section 1, asking the court to decide that
even if the itemized list in section 1 were not a closed set when no state
law tried to override municipal power, it should be so held for extraterritorial eminent domain in conflict with a state statute. In other words, the
state could override the town for all purposes save those specified. Because Thornton involved one of those powers, it was distinguishable.
Second, Thornton was decided at a time when the Colorado Supreme Court's home rule jurisprudence had not yet crystallized into a
coherent scheme. 91 The court subsequently adopted a doctrine that allocates claims of municipal power into three categories: purely local, purely statewide, and mixed. Under this doctrine, only purely local claims
are immune from override by the state legislature. 92 The landowner argued that extraterritorial eminent domain should be categorized as mixed
and thus subject to legislative override.93
The court rejected the latter argument based on the Thornton
precedent. It held that the local-mixed-statewide form of analysis did not
apply, relying on reasoning lifted from the Thornton opinion:
Where the constitution specifically authorizes a municipal action
which potentially implicates statewide concerns, the municipality's
exercise of that prerogative is not outside the bounds of its authority.
...We therefore conclude that the extraterritorial condemnation of

87. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-25-201(1) (West 2009); see also supra note 22 (outlining
history of Colorado statutes allowing extraterritorial eminent domain by municipalities).
88. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
89. See CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-101(4)(b)(l1) (West 2009).
90.
See supra text accompanying notes 14-16 (discussing the proposed compromise).
91.
One can trace the modem doctrine to Woolverton v. City & County of Denver. 361 P.2d
982, 984 (Colo. 1961), overruled in partby Vela v. People, 484 P.2d 1204, 1206 (Colo. 1971). But
the court did not articulate a consistent formal test until City & County of Denver v. State. 788 P.2d
764, 768 (Colo. 1990).
92.
See City & County of Denver v. State, 788 P.2d at 767.
93. Telluride, 185 P.3d at 167; Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 9, at 18-19, 34-40.
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property need not be pursuant to a purpose that is purely local and
municipal.9
To reject the first claim the court again refused to read the itemized
list in article XX, section 1 to create distinctively stronger powers. It
invoked the many prior decisions that had treated the list as merely illustrative of broader powers. In particular, it invoked decisions that had
sustained extraterritorial condemnations of land for an army base95 and
for airport use.9 Therefore, the Thornton case could not be distinguished, and the court ruled for Telluride based on that precedent.9 The
landowner did not ask the court to overrule or limit Thornton, so the
court did not address that subject.
4. The Dissent
Justice Eid was the sole dissenter. The basis for her dissent is not
entirely clear. Her opinion embraced the landowner's proffered distinction between the enumerated powers in article XX, section 1 and powers
to acquire land for parks and open space. 98 Some passages appeared to
argue from that premise that home rule towns have never had constitutional power of extraterritorial eminent domain for purposes other than
those enumerated-the landowner's second claim discussed above.9
Other parts of her opinion appeared to assume that the power exists absent a conflicting statute, but concluded that the 2004 Telluride Amendment validly overrode it. She distinguished the Thornton precedent as an
exercise of an itemized power.'0°
C. How Broad Was the Ruling? Was It Correct?
The press reported that the Telluride decision gave Colorado's
home-rule municipalities unlimited power to condemn land anywhere in
the state for any purpose, a power the press strongly criticized.10' Journalists noted a prior situation where the City of Golden had threatened to
use its power of eminent domain to block installation of a digital broadcasting tower outside the city. 0 2 Golden was thwarted by federal

94.
Telluride, 185 P.3d at 167 (citation omitted).
95.
Id. at 166 (citing Fishel v. City & County of Denver, 108 P.2d 236, 241 (Colo. 1940)).
96.
Id. (citing City & County of Denver v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 156 P.2d 101, 103 (Colo. 1945)).
97.
Id.
98.
Id. at 172-73 (Eid, J., dissenting).
99.
See supra Part ILB.2.
100. See Telluride, 185 P.3d at 173 (Eid, J., dissenting).
101.
See Vincent Carroll, Editorial, Unleashing Mischief, DENVER ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWs,
June 6, 2008, at 39; Editorial, A Ruling Too Far: Supreme Court Gives Home-Rule Cities Alarming
Power, DENVER ROCKY MoUNTAIN NEws, June 5, 2008, at 38; Editorial, Wrong Course on Eminent
Domain, DENVER POST, June 4, 2008, at B 12.
102.
Michael Roberts, Golden Showers: A City's Plans Rain on Local TV Powerhouses,
DENVER WESTWORD, Apr. 13, 2006, available at http://www.westword.com2006-0413/news/golden-showers.
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preemption, and the facility was built; it mostly serves persons residing
outside of Golden. 0 3
The journalists surely overstated the case. Three limits can be
found in the opinion, although all are quite uncertain in scope. The most
basic point is the court's embrace of the phrase "local and municipal
matters" to define the "plenary power" of municipalities that the legislature cannot override' °4 The court can declare any future action by a city
or town to fall outside that definition. But of course the phrase is vague,
and uncertainty is increased by its use to mean quite different things.
When Article XX was adopted in 1902 and amended in 1912, drafters of
the texts did not address the question of whether and when a home rule
city can act unless a state statute lawfully overrides the city, the category
the supreme court later dubbed mixed. The text of section 6 defines municipal jurisdiction generally as "local and municipal matters" and adds a
list of specific powers and other terms that appear to define municipal
powers very broadly. 10 5 It then states that laws passed by a home-rule
city within the scope of its powers "supersede" a conflicting state law.' 6
The text led some supreme court justices to conceive of municipal and
state powers as two exclusive kinds with no overlap, a viewpoint not
expressly rejected until 1961107
Thereafter, doctrine evolved into the current system of local, mixed,
and statewide powers. Under this system, a home-rule city's powers
absent a conflicting state statute are a very broad swath of actions covering both local and mixed powers. The supreme court now often uses the
phrase "local and municipal matters" to define only those local powers
that trump conflicting state laws. 0 8 This usage is consistent with the
"supersedes" clause of article XX, section 6, but not with the section's
definition of the full range of municipal powers. The practice is not consistent because the court often quotes the phrase from section 6 when the
context means to refer to all local powers, including those subject to
override by the legislature. °9 The more precise term in current use is
103.
See Ann Schrader & Anne Mulkern, Congress OKs TV Tower, DENVER POST, Dec. 10,
2006, at C 1.
104.
Telluride, 185 P.3d at 166.
105.

COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6.

106.
Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 66.
107.
See Woolverton v. City & County of Denver, 361 P.2d 982, 990 (Colo. 1961), overruled
in part by Vela v. People, 484 P.2d 1204, 1206 (Colo. 1971). As is well known, the same question
plagued the federal Constitution for many years. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156
U.S. 1, 11 (1895) (discussing the distinction between the "essentially exclusive" police power of the
states and the "also exclusive" power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce).
108.
See, e.g., City & County of Denver v. State, 788 P.2d 764, 767 (Colo. 1990). City &
County of Denveris the court's leading case on point.
109.
Indeed, this is true of the Telluride opinion itself. The first uses of the phrase appeared to
describe the full range of local powers. See Telluride, 185 P.3d at 165. Later, the opinion rejected a
claim by the landowner that Telluride's external eminent domain power was not "purely local and
municipal." Id. at 167. Later yet, the phrase was repeatedly used with both its broad and restricted
meanings.
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"matters of local concern" to define local power to oust the state, in contrast to matters of "mixed local and state concern" to define powers that
municipalities can exercise subject to state override." 0 However, because the Telluride court rejected application of the local-mixedstatewide test, these more exact terms only appeared in the opinion's
reasoning for not applying the test.'
The second potential limit in the opinion is found in footnote 8 and
elaborated in the concurring opinion of Justice Coats." 2 The footnote
states in part:
Our past cases indicate that, although the legislature may not prohibit
the exercise of article XX powers, it may regulate the exercise of
those powers in areas of statewide or mixed state and local concern.
Therefore, the analysis of competing state and local interests would
be appropriate in a case involving a statute which merely regulates
home rule municipalities' exercise of their constitutional powers....
However, this line of cases does not compel us to analyze competing
state and local concerns in the case at hand, where the legislature
purports to abrogate,
not regulate, home rule powers granted by the
13
constitution.
A similar point arises from the court's strong reliance on the Thornton
precedent because that opinion applied some state statutes to14 Thornton's
condemnation action even as it held others unconstitutional.'
These points clearly approve of procedural laws that do not forbid
an action; this describes the statutes specifically sustained in the Thornton opinion." 5 In the Telluride case itself, the town obeyed state statutes
defining the procedures for eminent domain, including the laws allowing
the court to order mediation, allowing change of venue, limiting the jury
to freeholders, and paying the landowner's attorneys' fees.
But the focus of criticism is the substantive reach of the decision.
Its limits appear to depend on defining the section 6 phrase "local and
municipal matters." On this point, the court's opinion created confusion
and uncertainty by rejecting application of the local-mixed-statewide6
powers test that it uses to define local powers in most other situations."
The court appeared to do this because it assumed that any extraterritorial
action by a municipality must ipso facto involve statewide interest, be110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
1978).
115.
38-6-201
116.

See City & County of Denver, 788 P.2d at 767.
Telluride, 185 P.3d at 169.
Id. at 170 n.8; id. at 171-72 (Coats, J., concurring).
Id. at 170 n.8 (majority opinion).
City of Thornton v. Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co., 575 P.2d 382, 387-88, 392 (Colo.
Id. at 392 (upholding CoLO. REv. STAT. §§ 38-1-101 to -120, 38-6-101 to -122 (1973),
to -216 (1973 & Supp. 1976)).
See Telluride, 185 P.3d at 167.
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long in the mixed interest category, and be subject to state control. It
therefore rejected application of this scheme in favor of the view it had
taken in Thornton and other prior decisions, that extraterritorial eminent
domain is a specific power that is exempt from any balancing of statewide interests unless a statute regulates-but does not prohibit-an action. 11 7 This in turn gave rise to the inference that the power is unlimited,
despite the vague denial in footnote 8.
The court's precedents did not compel that analysis. As noted
above, the text of article XX, section 6 appears to give home rule governments exclusive power within their boundaries "and other jurisdiction." ' Yet the court has often allowed the state to override municipal
actions inside corporate boundaries, 19 and in the precedents reviewed in
the Telluride decision, it found extraterritorial actions to be immune from
state authority. 120 Any action by a municipal government has some effect outside its borders, so deciding on a constitutional line between local
and mixed powers requires a judgment about each situation that comes
down to a determination whether the statewide interest is important
enough to classify a power as mixed. In cases arising within municipal
borders, the court's precedents said as much, applied a four-part test to
make the determination, and opined that each case depends on its
facts.121
In Telluride, the crucial factor that negated use of this analysis was
the assumption that any action outside municipal boundaries was ipso
facto of statewide concern. 122 That would be correct in many circumstances, perhaps most, but on the Telluride record, ownership and use of
the Valley Floor land did not fairly present any issue of statewide concern. The land abuts the town and surrounds its highway access. The
one reasonable claim for statewide concern was to protect the interest of
San Miguel County, the territorial local government for the Valley Floor,
but the county sided with Telluride, declaring that the issue was local to

117.

Seeid. at 171.

118.

See discussion supra Part.II.B.2.

119.

See e.g., City of Commerce City v. State, 40 P.3d 1273, 1284 (Colo. 2002) (regarding

photo radar and red light cameras); Town of Telluride v. Lot Thirty-Four Venture, L.L.C., 3 P.3d 30,
39 (Colo. 2000) (regarding rent control).
120.
See supra note 72; see also Town of Frisco v. Baum, 90 P.3d 845, 849 (Colo. 2004)
(regarding powers of a municipal court).
121.

See, e.g., City & County of Denver v. State, 788 P.2d 764, 768-72 (Colo. 1990).

122.
The text of the Telluride Amendment asserts: "The acquisition by condemnation by a
home rule or statutory municipality of property outside of its territorial boundaries involves matters
of both statewide and local concern because such acquisition by condemnation may interfere with
the plans and operations of other local governments and of the state." COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381-101(4)(a)(1) (West 2009). However, if the legislature can override home-rule towns by including
such a finding in a statute, constitutional home rule is at an end. See Richard B. Collins, The Colorado Constitution in the New Century, 78 U. COLO. L. REv. 1265, 1334 (2007).
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Telluride. 23 The Valley Floor is a uniquely isolated piece of land that
affects few outsiders.
Legislative motivation for the Telluride Amendment was either
ideological opposition to any use of eminent domain to acquire land for
parks and open space, an attempt to accommodate the wishes of a wealthy landowner and potential campaign contributor, or some mix of both.
Neither has any particular relation to the question whether Telluride's
action should be characterized as involving a statewide concern; land
inside Telluride's borders would present the same question. If the state
had made its decision pursuant to a general plan for land use statewide,
such as the Land Use Act, there might have been a reasonable claim of
statewide interest, even for the Valley Floor.124 Instead, the Telluride
Amendment was an ad hoc measure adopted in great haste.
It is difficult to imagine a set of facts less favorable to state override
of local preferences. Strong views of those who live next to the land
were opposed by the ego of a nonresident billionaire owner who had
never lived there or had any ancestral tie to it. The jury awarded him his
full claimed value and attorneys' fees. The basis for the decision suggested here would have allowed many other cases to be decided the other
way, such as Golden's plan to condemn the broadcasting site. Had the
local-mixed-statewide doctrine been applied in Telluride without an automatic assumption that extraterritorial action cannot be local, the result
should have been the same, but the implications of the decision for other
situations far less sweeping. In a future case, the court might hold the
for
Telluride Amendment to be severable and sustain its 1 requirement
25
consent of the county, which was not at issue in the case.
Even if the modified analysis of the last four paragraphs were used,
the court's broad opinion raised a number of concerns. Telluride is one
of the most far-reaching decisions in favor of exclusive local power reported for any state. Moreover, a per se rule that extraterritorial jurisdiction is always subject to explicit state override (including home rule municipal laws) would furnish a bright-line rule that would avoid ad hoc
adjudication. Many extraterritorial actions will conflict with local territorial governments and with local majority opinion. Some municipal
126
actions are elitist and exclusionary, and thus in need of tempering.
These concerns show that the legal issues in Telluride were something of
a sideshow because extraterritorial actions in pursuit of the itemized utili123.
Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp., 185 P.3d 161, 169 & n.6 (Colo. 2008).
124.
See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
See CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-101(4)(b)(I1) (West 2008).
125.
126.
Criticism of cities on this account has focused on such issues as exclusionary zoning,
racial segregation, and tax resources of public schools. See generally Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism
Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the FavoredQuarter: Addressing the Barriersto New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985 (2000); Edward A. Zelinsky, Metropolitanisra,Progressivism, and Race, 98
COLUM. L. REv. 665 (1998) (book review).
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ties purposes in article XX, section 1 are not inherently more worthy than
others. This is implicitly conceded by the terms of the first legislative
bill introduced to try to undo the decision by making extraterritorial condemnations impossibly expensive-it would apply to takings for any
purpose.127
Il. WAS THE TELLURIDE AMENDMENT'S RETROACTIVE APPLICATION

INVALID?
[A] retroactive law is truly a monstrosity. Law has to do with the
governance of human conduct by rules. To speak of governing or directing conduct today by rules that will be enacted tomorrow is to
talk in blank prose. 128
All laws should be therefore made to commence infuturo, and be notified before
their commencement; which is implied in the term "pre129
scribed."'
Retroactive criminal laws are forbidden absolutely by the Ex Post
Facto and Bill of Attainder Clauses that were imposed by the original
Constitution on all American governments, state and federal. 30 The
clause that forbids state laws impairing the obligation of contracts outlaws one kind of retroactive civil laws. 131 Another is restricted by the
requirements of the Takings Clause.1 32 Laws that attempt to overturn
final judgments of courts violate separation of powers. 133 Beyond these,
the only constitutional limit on retroactive civil laws in most jurisdictions
is the Due Process Clause.134 However, every jurisdiction recognizes
Professor Fuller's concern, quoted above, by erecting a strong presumption 5that all new legislation is intended to be applied only prospective3
ly.

1

During the Twentieth Century, the problem of retroactivity became
a concern regarding some judicial decisions. Traditional law had treated
all judicial decisions as inherently retroactive on the theory that courts
127.
H.B. 09-1258, 67th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2009). The bill's lead sponsor,
Senator Shawn Mitchell, was also a lead sponsor of the Telluride Amendment. See COLO. H.
JOURNAL, Feb. 25, 2004,649-53.
128. LON L.FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 53 (rev. ed. 1969).
129.
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *46.
130.
U.S. CONST. art. L § 9, cl. 3 & § 10 el.
1.
131.
Id. art. I, § 10, cl.
1.
132.
Id. amend. V.
133. E.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 225-26 (1995).
134. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1; see also JOHN E. NOwAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 486 (7th ed. 2004).
135. For Colorado, see City of Colorado Springs v. Powell. 156 P.3d 461, 464-65 (Colo.
2007); see also COLO.REV. STAT. ANN. § 2-4-202 (West 2009) ("A statute is presumed to be prospective in its operation."). For Federal statutes, see United States v. Security IndustrialBank. 459
U.S. 70, 79 (1982) ("Ibe principle that statutes operate only prospectively, while judicial decisions
operate retrospectively, is familiar to every law student."); see also 73 AM. JuR. 2D Statutes § 245
(2008).
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merely declare the law and do not create new laws. 136 But when a court
overrules a prior decision, this theory is at least sorely strained. Some
other rulings are so novel as to raise like concerns. Publication of The
Nature of the Judicial Process, Judge Cardozo's celebrated work, provided the catalyst for courts to begin to issue rulings applying decisions
only prospectively. 137 After undertaking detailed enforcement of the bill
of rights in state criminal trials, the Supreme Court adopted prospective
overruling for many of its decisions that added to the rights of accused
persons. The Court's decisions in this field have generated volumes of
scholarship. 138 All of these rulings were made in the name of some notion of due process or fundamental fairness.
Colorado is one of seven states that add further constitutional barriers to retroactive civil laws:
[No law] retrospective in its operation, or making any irrevocable
grant of special privileges, franchises or immunities, shall be passed
by the general assembly. 139
The general assembly shall pass no law for the benefit of a railroad or
other corporation, or any individual or association of individuals, retrospective in its operation, or which imposes on the people of any
liability in respect
county or municipal subdivision of the state, a new
0
to transactions or considerations already past.14
The first provision was copied verbatim by Colorado's 1876 constitutional convention from the 1875 Missouri Constitution. 141 Its ancestor
was probably the New Hampshire Constitution, which uses somewhat
stronger words.1 42 Four other states have similar provisions. 143 The
second quoted provision was also copied from the 1875 Missouri Constitution and was later adopted in Montana, but it was subsequently re-

136. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69.
137. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOzO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 146-49 (1921); see
also Great N. Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364-66 (1932). See generally
Walter V. Schaefer, The Controlof "Sunbursts": Techniques of Prospective Overruling,42 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 631 (1967).
138.
See, e.g., Note, Rethinking Retroactivity, 118 HARV. L. REv. 1642 (2005).
§ 11.
139. COLO. CONST. art. lI,
140. Id. art XV, § 12; see also id. art. XV, § 8 (preserving the power of eminent domain over
the property of corporations).
141.
See MO. CONsT. of 1875 art. 11,§ 15.
142.
See N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 23 ("Retrospective laws are highly injurious, oppressive, and
unjust. No such laws, therefore, should be made, either for the decision of civil causes, or the punishment of offenses.").
143.
Tennessee forbids "retrospective" laws. TENN. CONST. art. L § 20. Three states forbid
"retroactive" laws. GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, 1 X; OHO CONST. art. II, § 28; TEx. CONST. art. L § 16.
The Montana Constitution forbids any "retrospective law" that imposes a "new liability" on past
events. MONT. CONST. art. XII § 1(3). The Alabama Constitution requires the title of a law to
indicate any intended retroactive effect. ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 45, construed in Ala. Educ. Ass'n v.
Grayson, 382 So. 2d 501, 505 (Ala. 1980).
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pealed in both states. 144 Nothing in the Colorado 1Convention
records
45
explained or elaborated the meaning of either clause.
The Colorado Supreme Court's first application of the article H
clause arose when a wrongful death judgment against a railroad was
based on a statute that was repealed during the railroad's appeal. The
court rejected the railroad's claim that this absolved it of liability retroactively, invoking both the barrier of article H, section 11, and the presumed legislative intent that a new statute operate prospectively.' 46 Thereafter, the court chose a verbal device to apply these sections, which
declared a retroactive law valid unless retrospective. 147 Because the two
words are dictionary synonyms, this simply attaches the retrospective
label to laws found to be invalid. The main substantive rule the court has
applied forbids retroactive laws that impair vested rights or impose new
obligations on past transactions. 48 Interpretations of other states' clauses
are similar.1 49 This formulation traces to an 1814 opinion of Justice Story on Circuit that is also followed in determining due process attacks on
retroactive laws. 50 On the other side of the ledger, the courts say that
5
retroactive laws that are remedial or procedural in character are valid.' '
The Colorado court's most recent application of the article II clause
showed willingness to broaden its reach. In 1998-99, Golden made five
agreements with developers that included incentives to invest in the city
in the form of tax rebates and subsidies that were reviewable each
year. 152 A 2001 city law (adopted by citizens' initiative) revoked this
commitment. Its purported retroactive application was marginal: elimi144.
MO. CONST. of 1875, art. XII, § 19. The former Montana Constitution was worded similarly to Colorado's article XV provision. See MONT. CONST. of 1889, art. XV, § 13, construed in
State ex rel. Souders v. Dist. Court, 12 P.2d 852, 855 (1932). The same text was proposed in California in 1878 but was not adopted. CAL. CONST. proposed amend. 298, § 8 (1878), available at
http:llwww.sos.ca.gov/archives/1879/archive/F3956-11 .pdf.
145.
See TIMOTHY O'CONNOR, SEC'Y OF STATE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION HELD IN DENVER, DECEMBER 20,1875 TO FRAME A CONSTITUTION FOR THE STATE OF

COLORADO at 90, 143, 204, 487 (1907) (reciting the text of both sections repeatedly without interpreting or explaining either of them). However, the convention delegates' intent to restrict the
power of corporations was manifest. See OESTERLE & COLLINS, supra note 62, at 6-7, 313-16;
Donald Wayne Hensel, A History of the Colorado Constitution in the Nineteenth Century, 134-55
(1957) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Colorado) (on file with the Wise Law Library,
University of Colorado, Boulder).
146.
Denver, South Park & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Woodward, 4 Colo. 162, 168-69 (1878).
147.
See OESTERLE & COLLINS, supra note 62, at 44-45.
148.
See id.
149.
See, e.g., Goldrush n v. City of Marietta, 482 S.E.2d 347, 358 (Ga. 1997); Dep't of Soc.
Servs. v. Villa Capri Homes, Inc., 684 S.W.2d 327, 332-33 (Mo. 1985); Wallace v. Mont. Dep't of
Fish, Wildlife & Parks, 889 P.2d 817, 819-22 (Mont. 1995); Socha v. City of Manchester, 490 A.2d
794, 795 (N.H. 1985); Vogel v. Wells, 566 N.E.2d 154, 161-62 (Ohio 1991); Dark Tobacco Growers' Coop. Ass'n v. Dunn, 266 S.W. 308, 312 (Tenn. 1924); McCain v. Yost, 284 S.W.2d 898, 900
(Tex. 1955). There does not appear to be a decision under any of these provisions that departs from
the "vested rights" formulation.
150.
Soc'y for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756, 767-69 (Cir. Ct.
D.N.H. 1814); see also Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 268-69 (1994).
151.
See, e.g., Cont'l Title Co. v. Dist. Court, 645 P.2d 1310, 1315 (Colo. 1982).
152.
City of Golden v. Parker, 138 P.3d 285, 288 (Colo. 2006).
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nation of future subsidies and rebates to developers who had invested
previously in expectation of continued annual consideration of rebates
and subsidies. The 2001 law did not impair any vested rights in the traditional sense; the repudiated commitment was not to give rebates and
subsidies, only to consider giving them each year. The court nevertheless invalidated application of the 2001 law to pre-2001 investors on the
theory that they had a vested right to annual consideration of rebates and
subsidies. 153
The 2004 Telluride Amendment did not impair vested rights, not
even in the attenuated sense of the Golden case. Nor did it impose new
obligations on a completed past transaction because the condemnation
action had been filed shortly before the enactment. It did overturn expectations of Telluride residents that they could preserve the Valley
Floor, but that is a public expectation, and past decisions have protected
only private rights. m On the other hand, the Amendment was in no
sense remedial or procedural in character. Therefore, an attack on its
retroactive application would have presented a novel issue.
A further problem for Telluride might have been the traditional rule
that denies local governments standing or capacity to claim rights against
their states on the theory that they are but arms of the state, unless the
state gives express permission. 155 However, constitutional home rule is
often held to allow municipalities to sue their states to challenge invasion
appear to assume this,
of home-rule powers. 156 Colorado decisions
157
though no explicit ruling has been reported.
Telluride's case for invalidation would focus not on the kind of injury caused, but on the claim that the statute's retroactive application was
a special accommodation to a single, powerful party. Many state consti-

153.
Id. at 296. The annual consideration ritual was necessary to comply with Colorado's
constitutional debt restriction. See COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20(4)(b); see also Golden, 138 P.2d at
291-92.
154. See OEsTRIE & COLLINS, supranote 62, at 44-45.
155.
See Harold A. Olsen, Note, ProceduralBarriersto Suits Against the State by Local Government, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 431, 437 (1996). In Colorado, see Board of County Commissioners v.
Vail Associates. 19 P.3d 1263, 1270 (Colo. 2001). Colorado law gives counties that are sued authority to challenge the constitutional validity of a statute as a defense to the action, but there is no
general authority to initiate a constitutional challenge. See COLD. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-11-105.1
(West 2009).
The Colorado authorities use the term "standing" to describe the authority at issue. Olsen
explains that "capacity" is a more accurate term. See Olsen, supra, at 437-40. A similar rule forbids
unauthorized suits by officers to challenge the constitutionality of laws defining their duties. See,
e.g., Lamm v. Barber, 565 P.2d 538, 544 (Colo. 1977), questioned on othergrounds in Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Fifty-First Gen. Assembly, 599 P.2d 887, 890-91 (Colo. 1979).
156. See, e.g., Olsen, supranote 155, at 447.
157.
See, e.g., City & County of Denver v. State, 788 P.2d 764 (Colo. 1990) (allowing suit
against the state to enforce home rule with no discussion of city's standing or capacity). No challenge was made in Telluride to the town's capacity or standing to challenge the constitutional validity of the Telluride Amendment as a defense. See Town of Telluride v. San Miguel Valley Corp.,
185 P.3d 161 (Colo. 2008).
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tutions include a provision forbidding "local or special laws."' 58 These
provisions achieved their procedural goal of forcing legislatures to act by
general and uniform laws, but any substantive aim to prevent unfair favoritism has not succeeded because there is no good way to define which
laws should be overturned. 5 9 All laws require majority support, and
achieving that support is the essence of democracy. All laws are in some
sense special, and many perfectly good laws are local in some sense or
another. But retroactivity is an important additional factor. Making a
new law just retroactive enough to benefit a single wealthy interest that
procured the law can be walled off as a distortion of democracy. Colorado's article 11 ban on retrospective laws condemns "special privileges."
Article XV's unique ban expressly forbids retrospective laws that benefit
a single corporation. It also seems to give municipalities standing to
invoke the provision.
When applied to complex statutory schemes with broad social impact, such as tax and welfare laws, retroactivity can raise complex issues
of intertemporal equity that have generated sophisticated academic analyses. 16° However, the sort of retroactivity involved in the Telluride case
raised no such concern. A shift in policy to forbid use of eminent domain to create parks and open space is exactly the sort of change that can
and ought to be prospective only. The legislature implicitly recognized
this in the bill on urban renewal to which the Telluride Amendment
was
161
operation.
in
prospective
entirely
was
bill
the
of
rest
the
attached:
IV. LITIGATION, LEGISLATION, PUBLIC POLICY, AND THE PROPERTY
RIGHTS MOVEMENT

The Telluride eminent domain case is a dramatic illustration of the
distortions litigation can create for orderly public policy. The case was
quite unusual. The decision to condemn the land was made by Telluride's citizens rather than its government officials. Indeed, the officials
reached a compromise with the owner that the citizens rejected. Questions about possible above-market values of a resident owner who is subjected to condemnation were largely inverted because the absentee lan158.
See, e.g.,
COLO.CONST. art. V, § 25; see also Thomas F. Green,Jr., A MalapropianProvision of State Constitutions, 24 WASH. U. L.Q. 359, 359 & n.2 (1939) (stating that half the states
had such provisions at that time).
159.
This statement is illustrated by any published discussion of the workings of these provisions; all show their limited effects. See, e.g., OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., HANDBOOK OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAw 96-103 (2d ed. 2001); Green, supra note 158, at 362-66. A sophisticated proposal to define this limit in terms of good and bad logrolling concluded that the determination would
be very difficult. The key part of such a rule would be whether logrolls producing allegedly special
or local laws should be presumed valid or invalid. The proposal concluded that they should be
presumed valid. See Clayton P. Gillette, Expropriationand Institutional Design in State and Local
Government Law, 80 VA. L. REv. 625, 642-57 (1994).
160.
See, e.g., DANIEL SHAVIRO, WHEN RULES CHANGE: AN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
ANALYSIS OF TRANSITION RELIEF AND RETROACTIVITY 43-52 (2000); Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity
and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110 HARV. L.REV. 1055, 1056-58 (1997).
161.
See H.B. 04-1203, 64th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2004).
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downer had never lived on the land, 162 while local residents passed
through it often. Instead of an orderly review of the subject of extraterritorial eminent domain, an amendment was hastily tacked onto a bill
about urban renewal. 163 The amendment's legal theory was the same as
the litigation strategy of the eminent domain defendants, a theory with
little relation to the policies at stake. The amendment may have hardened Telluride's voters against a compromise with the landowner. As
discussed above, there was no significant statewide interest in the condemnation, contrary to most such cases.164 The Colorado Supreme Court
reached a defensible result on the facts of this unusual case but generated
uncertainty and criticism by its vague and overbroad opinion.
The Telluride Amendment was inspired by loosely aligned groups
known to supporters and opponents alike as the property rights movement. 165 The movement places a high priority on restricting use of eminent domain, a goal pursued both politically and in litigation. 166 The
movement's principal opponents are organizations often described as the
environmental movement. 167 The major political parties claim to support
both property rights and the environment, but when environmental policies conflict with landowners' interests, there are rather clear differences
between them. Republicans typically side with landowners against environmental preservation, while Democrats favor the environment. 68 A
concrete example is current battles over the Endangered Species Act.' 69

162. The San Miguel Valley Corporation owns a handsome house inside Telluride that is
occasionally used by members of the Blue family. Telephone Interview with Kevin J. Geiger, Telluride Town Attorney (Feb. 9, 2009). However, very few people have resided on the condemned land
since abandonment of the early mining settlement of San Miguel City. See Telluride and Mountain
Village
Official
Visitor
Guide,
The
Valley
Floor
Legacy,
http://www.telluridevisitorguide.com/townsValleyFloor.asp (last visited Apr. 18, 2009).
On the valuation issue, see generally Janice Nadler & Shari Seidman Diamond, Eminent
Domain and the Psychology of Property Rights: Proposed Use, Subjective Attachment, and Taker
Identity, 5 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 713, 739-42 (2008); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Forest Jourden, Remedies and the Psychology of Ownership, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1541, 1542-53 (1998) (arguing for
higher eminent domain valuations based on the so-called endowment effect when owner-occupiers
are displaced by takings). A recent study argued that claims of undercompensation resulting from
non-monetary values of residents displaced by eminent domain may be overstated. See Nicole Stelle
Garnett, The Neglected PoliticalEconomy of Eminent Domain, 105 MICH. L. REV. 101 (2006).
163. See supranotes 10- 12 and accompanying text.
164. See supratext accompanying notes 116-25.
165. See, e.g., Steven J. Eagle, The Birth of the Property Rights Movement, POL'Y ANALYSIS,
Dec. 15, 2005, at 3, availableat http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa558.pdf.
166.
See id. at 25-34.
167.
See MARK E. RUSHEFSKY, PUBLIC POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: AT THE DAWN OF THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 284-85 (3d ed. 2002).

168.

Party platforms try to straddle these issues, but the differences stated in the text are there.

Compare COMM. ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE 2008 REPUBLICAN NAT'L CONVENTION, 2008

REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 36, 54, available at http://platform.gop.com/2008Platform.pdf (last visited
Apr. 18, 2009), with 2008 DEMOCRATIC NAT'L CONVENTION COMM., THE 2008 DEMOCRATIC

NATIONAL PLATFORM 42 (2008), available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/apache.3cdn.net/
8a738445026dId5fDf_bcm6b5l7a.pdf.
169.
See, e.g., Bryan Walsh, Endangered Species: In More Danger, TIME, Aug. 12, 2008,
available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1832164,00.html?xid=rss-nation.
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Another is the Telluride Amendment, passed when Republicans
con170
trolled all three political branches of Colorado government.
A second policy that may have driven the Telluride Amendment
was economic development. The stormy debate about the Kelo case descried use of eminent domain for urban renewal, an anti-development
view. 171 Nevertheless, historical uses of eminent domain have mostly
been pro-development, public or private. Land was taken to intensify its
use or to supply services to other developments. Takings for parks were
a limited exception, but only in recent years has the power been used to
preserve open space and other ambient resources.172 For some policy
makers, that is a negative use that they wish to limit or forbid. 73 This is
another important question of public policy that was poorly served by
chasing a pending lawsuit of peripheral relevance.

170.
See Julia C. Martinez, Governor Owens Cheers on GOP, Says Economy a Priority,
DENVER POST, Nov. 7, 2002, at E3.
171.
See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text. Political opposition to Kelo has been very
broad, from Ralph Nader to Rush Limbaugh. See Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the
Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009), available at
https://www.law.northwestern.edu/colloquium/constitutionallaw/PostKeloReform.pdf"
172.
See Joseph L. Sax, Why American Has a Property Rights Movement, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV.
513, 514-16 (2005). Older treatises on eminent domain made no mention of its use for open space
other than parks. See, e.g., I JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE
UNITED STATES 405-95 (2d ed. 1900). By contrast, current treatises prominently discuss the subject,
relying entirely on recent authorities. See, e.g., 8 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § GI4D (2008).
173.
A frequent issue in debates about takings law and policy is whether government regulation that limits private development should be valid without just compensation. The property rights
movement strongly seeks to restrict governments' power to impose such regulations. See, e.g.,
Eagle, supra note 165, at 14-15.

